On the issue of the trigger of the armed uprising in Petrograd on February 27, 1917

Introduction. An important factor in the victory of the revolution in February 1917 was the transfer of a significant part of the troops of the capital's garrison to the workers' side on February 27. The trigger for this behavior of the soldiers was two interrelated events: the order of Nicholas II, given on February 25 to the commander of the Petrograd Military District, General S. S. Khabalov, demanding that the "riots" in the capital be stopped, and the execution of this order by the troops on February 26 – shooting the majority of the unarmed population. Both scientifically and practically, it is important to investigate how a trigger triggers the transition from one state of society to another, changing the course of events.

Purpose and objectives. To analyze the causes and consequences of the telegram sent by the tsar to S. S. Khabalov; to find out whether there was another option for restoring calm in the capital; to consider how the actions of Nicholas II on the evening of February 25, 1917 characterized him as a statesman.

Theoretical Basis. History, along with other sciences, studies such scientifically and practically relevant issues as:

• The relationship between regularity and historical chance. Were revolutions, the collapse of political regimes, and wars a natural consequence of the previous course of history or the result of a combination of coincidences?

• The role of personality in history. Individuals (Alexander the Great, B. Napoleon, V. I. Lenin, I. V. Stalin) or the masses (classes, peoples) determine the course of history? In this article, we use an elitist approach (paradigm), which involves focusing on studying the activities and roles of individuals or their groups on the eve and during the events being studied.

Results. The article examines the degree of awareness of Nicholas II during his stay at the Headquarters in Mogilev about the "riots" in Petrograd on February 23-24, 1917. His views on the power of the autocrat and the impact of Empress Alexandra Feodorovna on his worldview are analyzed. The causes and consequences of the telegram sent by the tsar to S. S. Khabalov on February 25 have been revealed. Another variant of the emperor's possible actions is analyzed in order to calm the population of the capital. It is considered what qualities of a statesman Nicholas II demonstrated on the evening of February 25, 1917.

Conclusions. 1. On February 25, the sending of an order to General S. S. Khabalov for the immediate cessation of unrest in the capital was the result of Nicholas II's inner conviction that he was obliged to rule alone. This conviction was constantly fueled by the energetic instructions of his wife Alexandra Fedorovna, who demanded that the emperor show firmness. 2. By sending the analyzed telegram, the emperor demonstrated in practice such managerial qualities as poor knowledge of the situation in the capital (he underestimated the low authority of the authorities in society and in the army), the inability to foresee the consequences of his decisions and the inability to predict the possible course of events. 3. Once again, in a situation of choosing between dialogue, compromise with society, or violence, the emperor chose violence, as he had repeatedly done during the previous 22 years of his reign.

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